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WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS? ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION‘S NEGLECTED FRONTIER 
NATASHA AFFOLDER† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale natural resource and infrastructure projects create some of 
the most challenging and high-stakes contexts for environmental regu-
lation. They are marked by a diversity of parties, including project 
sponsors, contractors, commercial lenders, international financial insti-
tutions, numerous government agencies, and important non-contracting 
parties including local communities, indigenous peoples, and environ-
mental and human rights NGOs. Complexity is added by the multiplic-
ity of jurisdictions from which these parties emerge. Networks of local 
and foreign investors, domestic and international banks, and local and 
international NGOs surround large projects with complex webs. And 
the laws of multiple jurisdictions shape the project documents and ave-
nues for dispute resolution. Large projects often impose a new legal 
infrastructure on a country as well as a web of interlinked contracts, 
many of which will be delocalized through international arbitration 
clauses and references to foreign law, as well as ―international stan-
dards‖. 
One might expect scholars of environmental law and regulation to 
be circling these projects with anticipatory zeal, salivating at the oppor-
tunities for interdisciplinary, policy-relevant, and empirically rich re-
                                                     
†
  Associate Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. I appreciate 
the highly insightful comments of the anonymous reviewers of this article. I also 
thank Jalia Kangave for helpful research assistance and thank all the participants in 
the UBC workshop on responsive regulation for a lively and enriching conversa-
tion. 
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search. As regulatory spaces, large projects provide a fascinating locus 
for the study of multi-layered environmental regulation in situations of 
considerable complexity. But to date, large projects have demonstrated 
remarkable immunity from the insights of regulatory scholarship. As-
sessments of national approaches to environmental regulation of natural 
resources remain the preferred lens.1 Project-specific studies, where 
they exist, are often isolated within siloed areas of research focus, 
whether geographic or subject-specific.2 Barriers between deep reser-
voirs of practitioner knowledge and areas of current scholarly interest 
may also be to blame. 
A workshop that celebrates John Braithwaite‘s contributions to regu-
latory scholarship, and particularly to responsive regulation, provides 
an opportune moment to reflect on this lacuna in environmental regula-
tory research. Responsive regulation emerged as an attempt to tran-
scend the confines of a stale, polarized theoretical debate over free 
markets versus government regulation.3 Responsive regulatory theory 
advances a dynamic, flexible, actor-oriented model of regulation that 
envisages regulation as an ongoing process of moves and counter-
moves by regulators, fine-tuned to the individual actors involved and 
their conduct. Responsive regulation can thus be situated within a wider 
body of scholarship on ―decentred‖ approaches to regulation which are 
                                                     
1
  See e.g. the excellent collections of largely country-specific case studies to emerge 
out of the work of the Academic Advisory Group of the International Bar Associa-
tion‘s Section on Energy, Environment, Natural Resources and Infrastructure Law, 
including: Barry Barton et al, eds, Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [Barton et al, Regulating]; Donald N Zillman, 
Alastair R Lucas & George (Rock) Pring, eds, Human Rights in Natural Resource 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Donald L Zillman et al, eds, 
Beyond the Carbon Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Aileen 
McHarg et al, eds, Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
2
  For example, much current environmental research on large projects focuses on 
environmental impact assessment processes. An opportunity exists to integrate this 
work within larger multi-layered studies of project-specific environmental regula-
tion. 
3
  The earliest full articulation of the theory of responsive regulation can be found in 
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregula-
tion Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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attentive to the actions of the regulated.4 In Braithwaite‘s own words, 
―[t]he basic idea of responsive regulation is that governments should be 
responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response is needed.‖5 This is 
graphically expressed through regulatory pyramids of sanction and sup-
port.6 At the base of the regulatory pyramid of sanctions lie dialogic 
approaches to securing compliance; sanctions escalate as a regulator 
moves up the pyramid. 
This article provides reflections on one of the newer aspects of re-
sponsive regulatory theory most relevant to the large project context—
the networking of pyramidal actors. Braithwaite‘s restatement of the 
theory of responsive regulation in this volume draws attention to the 
capacity of regulators to ―escalate by networking in more regulatory 
partners to put pressure on a regulated firm.‖7 The multiplicity of poten-
tial regulators, and the use of networked governance, resonates strongly 
with the realities of large project regulation. But the most significant 
imprint of responsive regulation on this article is methodological. Re-
flecting upon responsive regulation as a methodological project invites 
us to probe more closely the potential application of a ―Braithwaitean‖ 
methodology to large project research.  
Braithwaite‘s 1992 book (with Ian Ayres), Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate,8 combines careful empirical 
investigation, ambitious meta-analysis, and dynamic theorizing. It 
represents precisely the type of big-picture research that is lacking in 
the large project context. The authors offer a synthesis of regulatory 
insights gleaned from an expansive study of diverse industries, coun-
                                                     
4
  See Barry Barton, ―The Theoretical Context of Regulation‖ in Barry Barton et al, 
Regulating, supra note 1, 11 at 23–24, citing Julia Black, ―Decentring Regulation: 
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‗Post-Regulatory‘ 
World‖ (2004) 54:1 Curr Legal Probs 103. 
5
  John Braithwaite, ―Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies‖ (2006) 
34:5 World Development 884 at 886 [citation omitted] [Braithwaite, ―Developing 
Economies‖]. 
6
  John Braithwaite, ―The Essence of Responsive Regulation‖ (2011) 44:3 UBC L 
Rev 475  at 482, figure 1 [Braithwaite, ―Essence‖]. 
7
  Ibid at 508, citing Peter Drahos, ―Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: 
A Nodal Governance Approach‖ (2004) 77:2 Temp L Rev 401. 
8
  Supra note 3. 
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tries, and social contexts. The theory is dynamic, and the learning is 
ongoing. The refinement of the theory of responsive regulation offered 
in this volume is evidence of this fact.9  
When one reflects upon the methodological project of Braithwaite‘s 
ongoing work on responsive regulation, one sees the many parallels 
with his contributions to other areas of scholarship—his study with Pe-
ter Drahos of global business regulation,10 his work on restorative jus-
tice,11 and his current project with Val Braithwaite, Hilary 
Charlesworth, and Kate Macfarlane on peacebuilding.12 Each of these 
studies is ambitious in its scope and involves the synthesis of a signifi-
cant body of new research and theory. Peacebuilding Compared is con-
ceived as a twenty-year research project to code 670 variables in rela-
tion to armed conflicts that have raged across the planet since 1990.13 
Global Business Regulation encompasses over ten years of research, 
more than five hundred interviews, and a final text of 629 pages. The 
book, like much Braithwaite‘s work, combines close empirical investi-
gation of individual case studies (gained through extensive field work 
and interviews) with a meta-analytic approach that situates these indi-
vidual case studies within a rich, theoretically-informed understanding 
of context. Case studies stand alone as valuable empirical accounts. But 
combined, these case studies provide the basis for integrated theories of 
governance and regulation, with potentially widespread application. 
The combination of close empirical investigation, policy-oriented pre-
scription, and theoretical rigour is rare in work of such expansive scope. 
This is exactly the sort of work that is needed now in the area of envi-
ronmental regulation of large projects. 
                                                     
9
  Braithwaite, ―Essence‖, supra note 6. 
10
  John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000) 
11
  See e.g. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Reg-
ulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
12
  See e.g. John Braithwaite et al, Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: 
Sequencing Peace in Bougainville (Canberra: Australian National University E 
Press, 2010). 
13
  John Braithwaite et al, Anomie and Violence: Non-Truth and Reconciliation in In-
donesian Peacebuilding (Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2010) 
2. 
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The objective of this article is to help set the stage for the emergence 
of such empirically-informed, interdisciplinary, and theoretically nu-
anced research on large projects. The article is organized in three parts. 
In the next section, I tackle the question ―why study large projects?‖ I 
then describe the contours of environmental regulation in the large pro-
ject context, with a preliminary mapping of existing scholarship. In the 
final section, I turn to a discussion of the methods of large project re-
search, and suggest three points of entry through which environmental 
regulatory research might develop in large project contexts: (1) through 
contracts, (2) through monitoring and oversight, and (3) through refer-
ences to ―international standards‖. The conclusion turns to the meth-
odological demands of building and synthesizing project-specific re-
search.  
II.  WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS? 
Asking why regulatory scholars should study large projects amounts to 
asking two questions: (1) why adopt a project-specific lens for regula-
tory study? and (2) why focus this lens on the subset of large projects? 
To answer the first question, individual projects provide ―strategic re-
search sites‖ for a grounded understanding of how regulatory webs 
function.14 Scholarship on environmental regulation often adopts a lens 
which focuses on a particular regulatory technique (for example, envi-
ronmental impact assessment, environmental taxes, permitting, litiga-
tion, environmental disclosures, socially responsible investment, self-
regulation, or principles-based regulation). In contrast, by adopting a 
project-specific lens, the actual functioning and interaction of multi-
layered regulatory practices can be understood in a fine-grained and 
highly contextualized manner. The ways in which environmental regu-
latory tools complement or undermine each other may be appreciated 
by mapping the regulatory webs that govern individual projects. 
                                                     
14
  Robert Merton uses the term ―strategic research site‖ to refer to ―sites, objects, or 
events that exhibit the phenomena to be explained or interpreted to such advantage 
and in such accessible form that they enable the fruitful investigation of previously 
stubborn problems and the discovery of new problems for further inquiry.‖ See Ro-
bert K Merton, ―Three Fragments from a Sociologist‘s Notebooks: Establishing the 
Phenomenon, Specified Ignorance, and Strategic Research Materials‖ (1987) 13 
Annual Review of Sociology 1 at 1–2. 
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Secondly, why do ―large‖ projects deserve particular attention? To 
answer this, the specific nature of large projects needs to be better ex-
plored. Large projects can be defined as natural resource or infrastruc-
ture projects costing five hundred million dollars or more.15 In the case 
of dams, they are often defined by physical size.16 These definitions, on 
their own, may fail to give a real sense of these projects. A better under-
standing of their scale and complexity emerges from thinking about the 
contractual and regulatory webs by which they are governed. A typical 
large project may involve fifteen or more contracting parties from a 
number of different countries, tied together through over forty major 
contracts.17 For example, the financing piece alone for the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline required 208 finance documents and more than 17,000 
signatures from 78 parties.18  
The world‘s growing demand for energy and natural resources, cou-
pled with the exhaustion of easily accessible natural resource deposits, 
means that international oil and mining companies are initiating large 
projects in remote areas that have been relatively untouched by major 
industrial activity. These projects involve billions of dollars of capital. 
Their scope is such that host countries have never seen, let alone at-
tempted to regulate, projects of this magnitude. Many of these projects, 
particularly pipeline projects, are multi-jurisdictional.  
A new generation of large projects introduces particular social and 
ecological risks. These risks emerge with the use of untested or highly 
                                                     
15
  This definition is adopted from Benjamin C Esty, ―Why Study Large Projects? An 
Introduction to Research on Project Finance‖ (2004) 10:2 European Financial Man-
agement 213 at 214, 218 (citing major mines, pipelines, oilfields, toll roads, 
bridges, telecommunication systems, and power plants as common examples of 
large projects). 
16
  For example, the International Commission on Large Dams defines a large dam to 
mean ―a dam with a height of fifteen metres or more from the foundation.‖ If dams 
are between five and fifteen metres high and have a reservoir volume of more than 
three million cubic metres, they are also classified as large dams; see World Com-
mission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Mak-
ing—The Report of the World Commission on Dams (London: Earthscan, 2000) at 
11. 
17
  Esty, supra note 15 at 216. These parties may include sponsors and contractors, 
suppliers, host governments, and lenders. 
18
  Hugh Pope, ―Caspian Pipeline Financing Solidifies U.S. Policy‖, Wall Street Jour-
nal (3 February 2004) A13. 
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invasive technologies (e.g., genetic manipulation, nuclear fission, or 
chemical hydraulic fracking), the extension of extractive activities into 
hostile environments (e.g., deep oceans, polar regions, or tropical rain-
forests), and the challenges that arise through operations in especially 
corrupt regimes and settings of historic and current conflicts and vio-
lence. These realities point to a unique aspect of large project regula-
tion: their very scope often requires broad reforms of national regula-
tory regimes. Like large industrial disasters, large projects motivate 
regulatory reform and innovation.19 A conventional approach to regula-
tory analysis focuses on how regulation shapes a particular project. The 
magnitude of large projects means that an equally relevant inquiry is the 
extent to which a particular project irrevocably alters the nature and 
practices of regulation in a particular jurisdiction. Large projects leave 
an indelible mark, not only on business practices in a jurisdiction, but 
also on legal and regulatory regimes. 
The majority of scholarship on regulation focuses on a set of as-
sumptions that have developed through the study of regulatory contexts 
featuring single dominant regulators, who are governmental actors, op-
erating in the context of developed countries. In contrast, large projects 
involve multiple regulators (often with conflicting mandates), powerful 
non-state actors, and while projects frequently (but not exclusively) 
occur in developing countries, many regulators are transnational. The 
large project context thus provides an opportunity to explore how well 
elements of regulatory theory ―travel‖ to settings distinct from those in 
which these elements were initially described. 
Based on these initial observations of the nature of large projects, I 
turn now to further explore two explanations for why large projects 
provide a productive setting in which to study environmental regulation 
and potentially extend existing regulatory theories. The first is that large 
projects offer strategic research sites for understanding the interaction 
of regulatory webs. The second is that the scale of large projects means 
that project-specific regulation may critically shape future law and prac-
tice in a project‘s jurisdiction.  
                                                     
19
  See Fiona Hanes, Globalization and Regulatory Character: Regulatory Reform 
After the Kader Toy Factory Fire (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) for a thoughtful ac-
count of post-disaster regulatory reform in Thailand. 
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A. THE INTERACTION OF REGULATORY WEBS  
In suggesting that large projects provide a useful research site for un-
derstanding the interaction of regulatory approaches, I draw attention to 
the fact that these projects are of such scale and complexity that issues 
of environmental regulation are necessarily multi-layered. Regulation, 
defined in the context of large projects, is an expansive concept. It can 
be seen as ―the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes.‖20 This definition 
encompasses regulation by a range of state and non-state actors (NGOs, 
private banks, and insurers, to name a few) which are critical sources of 
regulation in large project contexts. It extends beyond standard-setting, 
the licensing and permitting of new projects, and the enforcement of 
conditions on existing projects, to acknowledge the regulatory signifi-
cance of broader anticipatory processes to accommodate large projects, 
including attention to the cumulative effects of multiple projects, and 
strategic-level considerations of regional futures and sectoral policy 
implications. Such a definition moves regulation far beyond a consid-
eration of targeted rules which are enforced. Large projects offer par-
ticularly rich terrain for understanding the interplay between state regu-
lation and private orderings, as well as the operation of hybrid forms of 
regulation. The regulatory experiences of large projects can thus extend 
current understandings of regulation in important ways. 
Defining ―environmental‖ regulation in the large project setting is 
problematic. Arriving at satisfactory definitions of environmental law, 
environmental governance, and environmental regulation plague all of 
these areas of study. Environmental regulation, used here, extends be-
yond a biophysical notion of the environment, and beyond an approach 
to regulation that confines its mandate to pollution control or species 
protection. But its contours are difficult to fix. This is why it is tempting 
to speak of the ―environmental aspects of large project regulation‖ 
rather than ―environmental regulation‖. This label better captures the 
fact that we are talking about regulation that has environmental effects 
rather than regulation that necessarily emanates from a government de-
partment of the environment. But it is a cumbersome moniker. The 
                                                     
20
  Julia Black, ―Critical Reflections on Regulation‖ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 1 at 26. 
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same terminological dilemma results in many law schools hosting cen-
tres for ―law and the environment‖ rather than centres for ―environ-
mental law‖. Environmental law, like environmental regulation, risks 
too narrowly confining the parameters of the subject.21  
Environmental regulation in this broader context explores a diversity 
of regulatory tools that are used to respond to environmental chal-
lenges. It includes ―complicated mixtures of established legal concepts, 
sui generis reforms, non-legal regulatory ideals, policy and legal norms 
from a range of different jurisdictions.‖22 Environmental regulation 
emerges from a number of sources without explicit environmental pro-
tection mandates. For example, many categories of law impact the envi-
ronmental regulatory space of a large project: environmental law, finan-
cial law, corporate law, insurance law, contract law, public law, interna-
tional law, property law, torts. The environmental regulators of a large 
project may be international insurance companies, project finance com-
panies, development agencies, communities, activist organizations, pro-
ject partners, lenders and investors, parent companies, and arbitrators—
as well as national and local government officials.  
For legal scholars, the multiplicity of regulators and sites of regula-
tion poses considerable challenges as it demands a transcendence of 
disciplinary borders and bodies of expertise. An understanding of the 
tax and royalty regime applicable to a project may be critical to under-
standing environmental regulation. Knowledge of how international 
construction contract terms are interpreted by international arbitral bod-
ies may also be required. The way in which a global corporation has 
applied industry standards to its operations worldwide might lend fur-
ther insights into the environmental regime that will apply to the spe-
cific project. One danger inherent in research that focuses on ―environ-
mental regulation‖ is that project-specific regimes for addressing envi-
ronmental mitigation or ―environmental safeguards‖ become the sole 
subjects of inquiry. 
Project-specific regulation involves ―regulatory networks‖ or ―regu-
latory webs‖ where the identity of the key environmental regulator or 
                                                     
21
  See Richard Macrory, ―Maturity and Methodology: A Personal Reflection‖ (2009) 
21:2 J Envtl L 251 at 252. 
22
  Elizabeth Fisher et al, ―Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Envi-
ronmental Law Scholarship‖ (2009) 21:2 J Envtl L 213 at 225. 
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regulators may not be immediately apparent.23 In many projects, envi-
ronmental regulation may be shared among many governmental de-
partments. In federal states, this regulation may be split among depart-
ments of mining, wildlife, environment, and water, at both the regional 
and federal levels. Critical non-state actors such as international finan-
cial institutions, NGOs, and insurance companies may take on key 
regulatory roles.24 But to suggest that these state and non-state actors 
form webs or networks is only the first step in regulatory analysis. Un-
derstanding the ways in which diverse regulatory actors complement 
(or, conversely, undermine) each other also requires elucidation and 
more nuanced use of the term ―networks‖. Put another way, large pro-
ject-focused research demands the development and articulation of 
more rigorous techniques for understanding the interrelationships be-
tween local, regional, national, and international environmental forms 
of regulation, and state and non-state regulators. 
In John Braithwaite‘s most recent work on responsive regulation 
(and the subject of this issue), he describes an explicit role for network-
ing pyramidal governance by engaging wider networks of partners in 
the use of pyramids of support and sanction.25 Intuitively, a networked 
pyramidal structure appears to describe well some of the tools available 
to regulators working in large project contexts—particularly in develop-
ing countries, where the capacity of government regulators may be lim-
ited.26 However, a closer look at large projects suggests that a model 
that posits a government regulator ―harnessing‖ or mobilizing non-state 
actors such as local and transnational NGOs may overstate the degree 
of cooperation between these actors.27  
                                                     
23
  See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 10 at 7, for a fuller discussion of regulatory 
webs. 
24
  See e.g. Yinka O Omorogbe, ―Alternative Regulation and Governance Reform in 
Resource-Rich Developing Countries in Africa‖ in Barry Barton et al, Regulating, 
supra note 1, 39 at 41 (examining regulation by actors ―other than the authorities 
whose function it is to make law and regulation within the territory in question‖).  
25
  See Braithwaite, ―Essence‖, supra note 6 at 507; Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 3 
at 38–40. 
26
  Braithwaite, ―Developing Economies‖, supra note 5 at 889. 
27
  The use of networks to harness non-state actors is discussed by Braithwaite, ibid at 
889–96. The capacity of a government regulator to ―mobilize cheaper forms of so-
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NGOs each have their own agendas in large project debates, and the 
single-issue focus of some of these groups may function to undermine 
the partnership potential of these networks.28 The same can be said for 
socially responsible investors or insurance companies. In other words, 
―constellations‖ of regulatory actors that appear as networks may not 
actually operate as networks.29 Their manifestation may reflect only an 
ephemeral convergence of interests. The points of disagreement be-
tween the state regulator and the non-state network partner may be so 
acute that the network functions to undermine the functioning of the 
regulatory pyramid rather than to enhance it. Understanding how regu-
latory networking works also involves an appreciation of the ways in 
which an environmental regulator perceives environmental issues fit-
ting into the wider package of large project regulation. Issues framed as 
―environmental‖ often disguise other regulatory concerns. 
B. THE IMPACT OF PROJECTS ON REGULATORY REGIMES 
The second reason I offer for studying large projects is that the scale of 
these projects means they leave an ineffaceable mark on the regulatory 
frameworks of the countries where they occur. Sierra Leone introduced 
new mining legislation to facilitate the Koidu Kimberlite and Sierra 
Rutile projects.30 Madagascar‘s QIT Madagascar Minerals project, the 
first large scale mining project in the country by a private investor, led 
                                                                                                                
cial control‖ (ibid at 884) may be as limited as the regulator‘s capacity to regulate 
through command-and-control mechanisms.  
28
  For a critical look at NGO interests in the large project context, see Sebastian Mal-
laby, ―NGOs: Fighting Poverty, Hurting the Poor‖, Foreign Policy (1 September 
2004) 50. 
29
  I thank Susan Sturm for the useful image of the regulatory ―constellation‖. 
30
  This legislative reform includes the introduction of the Koidu Project Mining Lease 
(Modification and Ratification) Act 2002, Act No 6 of 2002 (KPML), and the Sier-
ra Rutile (Ratification) Act 2002, Act No 4 of 2002 (SRA), as well as development 
of a Core Mineral Policy. This legislation includes environmental requirements. For 
example, the KPML sets out provisions limiting pollution, restricting the use of wa-
ter and addressing the environmental impacts on affected communities (clauses 
6:3:1, 11:3). For a more thorough discussion of this legislation, see Priscilla 
Schwartz, ―Corporate Activities and Environmental Justice: Perspectives on Sierra 
Leone‘s Mining‖ in Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa, eds, Environmental Law 
and Justice in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 429 at 434. 
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to the enactment of new national mining legislation.31 In Uganda, the 
discovery of large oil deposits in the Lake Albert region by companies 
such as Heritage Oil culminated in the drafting of the Petroleum (Ex-
ploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010.32 
National legal reform and project approval often proceed in tandem as a 
result of World Bank Group interventions in a country. These interven-
tions include ―rewriting laws (particularly related to the regulation of 
natural resources, the environment, and property rights); restructuring 
state agencies that regulate the environment . . . and funding large-scale 
‗green‘ infrastructural projects.‖33 Each of these interventions is linked.  
In developed economies, we also see project-specific regulatory in-
novations emerge in response to the seemingly one-off challenges of 
large projects. These project-specific regulatory tools often become en-
trenched in regulatory practices, alter expectations, and lead to legisla-
tive reform.34 Large projects also have significant potential effects on 
regional development futures, sectoral policy development, and patterns 
of dependencies between nations. 
Individual projects do not only impact domestic environmental regu-
lation through legislative reform; treaty instruments and contracts also 
alter domestic regulatory practices. For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline introduced a new international treaty among 
the host states to ―ensure the principle of the freedom of transit of pe-
                                                     
31
  Brunno Sarrasin, ―Mining and Protection of the Environment in Madagascar‖ in 
Bonnie Campbell, ed, Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development (London: 
Pluto, 2009) 150 at 155–56. 
32
  See e.g. Robert D Langenkamp, ―Comments on the Uganda Petroleum Bill‖ (8 July 
2010), online: Revenue Watch International <http://www.revenuewatch.org>. 
33
  Michael Goldman, ―Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-Governmentality 
and Other Transnational Practices of a ‗Green‘ World Bank‖ (2001) 48:4 Soc Probs 
499 at 506. 
34
  See Natasha A Affolder, ―Rethinking Environmental Contracting‖ (2010) 21 J Envtl 
L & Prac 155. The negotiation of an environmental agreement to govern the Ekati 
Mine is an example of one such regulatory innovation that created expectations on 
the part of project-affected communities that other large mines would include simi-
lar agreements. The agreement formed a regulatory prototype for other large mining 
projects, and major proposed projects now are accompanied by demands for similar 
agreements. 
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troleum.‖35 This treaty will have repercussions for environmental regu-
lation of the project across the region as it provides for the freezing of 
local regulatory law, and an expedited process for the expropriation of 
land needed by the pipeline.36  
This issue of scale further explains the fact that large projects often 
attract their own sets of rules. Motivated by the promise of significant 
economic activity, there have been efforts in a number of jurisdictions 
to ―streamline‖ the environmental reviews of large projects, creating 
distinct environmental review processes which only apply to projects of 
a certain scale. The rationale for exempting large projects from the pro-
ject-review rules that would otherwise apply emanates from concerns 
about the ―regulatory burden‖ of multi-jurisdictional review for large 
projects.37 A few examples illustrate this point. In a spirit of encourag-
ing ―efficiency‖ and ―streamlining‖ the regulation of large natural re-
source projects, the Government of Canada introduced a Major Projects 
Management Office in 2007.38 In 2005, the Government of New South 
Wales introduced a Major Projects Assessment System based on legisla-
tion to streamline environmental review regulations for major projects 
in the state and to ―remove red tape‖ to help New South Wales ―remain 
                                                     
35
  Agreement Among The Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia and The Republic of Turkey 
Relating to the Transportation of Petroleum Via the Territories of The Azerbaijan 
Republic, Georgia and The Republic of Turkey Through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Main Export Pipeline (preamble), 18 November 1999, online: 
<http://subsites.bp.com> [Agreement]. See Abigail S Reyes, ―Protecting the ‗Free-
dom of Transit of Petroleum‘: Transnational Lawyers Making (Up) International 
Law in the Caspian‖ (2006) 24 Berkeley J Int‘l L 842. 
36
  Agreement, supra note 35 (Articles II(4)(iv) and IV). 
37 
 See e.g. Conference Board of Canada, Making Canada More Competitive: Improv-
ing Major Project Regulation in Canada (Toronto: Conference Board of Canada, 
2008). 
38
  See Canada, Major Projects Management Office, Reports and Publications: Cabi-
net Directive on Improving the Performance of the Regulatory System for Major 
Resource Projects (October 2007), online: MPMO <http://www.mpmo-
bggp.gc.ca>. The Major Projects Management Office (MPMO) is part of the De-
partment of Natural Resources, and is the result of the Cabinet Directive on Improv-
ing the Performance of the Regulatory System for Major Resource Projects. For 
each major resource project, the MPMO forms a ―Project Agreement‖ which sets 
out specific responsibilities and timelines for each governmental department in-
volved in regulatory approval to help streamline the regulatory process (ibid at Part 
I(a)(2)). 
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Australia‘s economic powerhouse.‖39 The UK‘s Planning Act 2008 cre-
ated a new institution, the Infrastructure Planning Commission,40 with 
the goal of ―streamlin[ing] the planning system for nationally signifi-
cant infrastructure projects.‖41  
Even absent specific legislation creating unique pathways for the re-
view of large projects, the wide discretionary powers of decision-
makers in certain jurisdictions to scope individual projects for environ-
mental assessment implies that, in practice, large projects can be subject 
to distinct rules and processes. For example, in Canada, a recent legisla-
tive change may allow for the exemption of certain large projects, or 
aspects thereof, from environmental review.42  
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LARGE PROJECTS: 
MAPPING THE FIELD 
An attempt to take stock of the field of scholarship that applies a pro-
ject-specific lens to the environmental regulation of large projects leads 
to a few immediate conclusions. A first observation is that large projects 
do not feature in textbooks of environmental law or international envi-
ronmental law. This points to a glaring gap in the scholarship: work that 
offers a synthesis of existing case studies—that builds, reflects upon, 
and identifies issues that cut across a range of projects. And it also sug-
gests that large project regulation is not routinely taught as an aspect of 
environmental law. 
                                                     
39
  Austl, NSW, Department of Planning, A Community Guide: NSW Major Projects 
Assessment System (March 2006), online: NSW Planning <http://www.planning 
.nsw.gov.au> at 2. The relevant regulatory provisions to enable the Projects As-
sessment System include an amendment to Part 3A of the Environmental Planning 
and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) and a new environmental planning instrument, the 
State Environmental Planning Policy (Major Projects) 2005 (NSW). 
40
  Planning Act 2008 (UK), c 29, s 1(1).  
41
  UK, Infrastructure Planning Commission, ―Our Role‖ (2010), online: <http:// 
infrastructure.independent.gov.uk>. 
42
  Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, ss 15(1), 7.1(2), as 
amended by Jobs and Economic Growth Act, SC 2010, c 12, part 20, which allows 
the Minister of the Environment to limit the scope of an environmental assessment 
―to one or more components of that project‖ and to exempt federally funded public 
utility projects (enumerated in the schedule to the Environmental Assessment Act) 
from environmental assessment.  
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Existing case studies that adopt a project-specific lens, mostly with 
different foci and emphases, stand alone. They are not integrated within 
a wider literature, and attempts to learn from these project-specific ex-
periences are also stifled. In this section, I draw together some of these 
diverse case studies of individual projects to begin to sketch the con-
tours of a body of work that adopts a project-specific lens to illuminate 
the environmental aspects of large project regulation. Much of this 
work is being produced by graduate students; this fact likely speaks to 
the time and travel demands of in-depth field work. Many single case 
studies offer a vision of large project regulation at a fixed point in time; 
this limits available accounts of the dynamism of large project regula-
tion over long periods. The existing scholarship is also generally pre-
scriptive. It often has an advocacy bent. It is uneven. Scholarship clus-
ters around a few topics of particular interest, including the environ-
mental impacts of actual,43 proposed,44 and even hypothetical45 large 
projects, and the adequacy of environmental assessment regimes for 
these projects.46 A recent Australian book, for example, takes a project-
specific focus to scrutinizing large project developments across Austra-
lia and the role of environmental assessment in project approvals.47 The 
rather universal conclusions of this body of work are that environmental 
                                                     
43
  See e.g. Ndenecho Emmanuel Neba & Banyuy Paul Ngeh, ―Environmental As-
sessment of the Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project in the Kribi Region of 
Cameroon‖ (2009) 4:5 International NGO Journal 225. 
44
  See e.g. Timothy Van Hinte, Managing Impacts of Major Projects: An Analysis of 
the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Proposal (Master of Resource Management Thesis, 
Simon Fraser University School of Resource and Environmental Management, 
2005), online: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca> [unpublished]. 
45
  See e.g. Kenneth S Culotta, ―Recipe for a Tex-Mex Pipeline Project: Considerations 
in Permitting a Cross-Border Gas Transportation Project‖ (2004) 39:2 Tex Int‘l LJ 
287. 
46
  See e.g. Sarah Njoki Macharia, ―A Framework for Best Practice Environmental 
Impact Assessment Follow-up: A Case Study of the Ekati Diamond Mine, Canada‖ 
(MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2005) [unpublished]; Ari Hershowitz, ―A 
Solid Foundation: Belize‘s Chalillo Dam and Environmental Decisionmaking‖ 
(2008) 35:1 Ecology LQ 73; Sanjay Jose Mullick, ―Power Game in India: Envi-
ronmental Clearance and the Enron Project‖ (1997) 16 Stan Envtl LJ 256. 
47
  Tim Bonyhady & Andrew Macintosh, eds, Mills, Mines and Other Controversies: 
The Environmental Assessment of Major Projects (Annandale: The Federation 
Press, 2010). 
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assessment processes, and particularly environmental assessment fol-
low-up, are inadequate.48  
The transnational nature of large project regulation is also attracting 
attention. Scholarship addressing the environmental regulatory regime 
for the BTC oil pipeline project, for example, draws attention to the 
ways in which large project regulation can be delocalized and transna-
tional treaties can become the prevailing legal regime;49 it also exam-
ines the environmental problems likely to emerge from the insulation of 
the pipeline project from domestic law.50 Sanjeev Khagram‘s work on 
resistance to dam projects has documented the multiple sites of envi-
ronmental regulation, including federal government, state, the World 
Bank, NGOs, and grassroots.51 A collection of essays and several indi-
vidual articles address the environmental policy, law, and liability con-
siderations applicable to the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project.52 The 
link between financing and environmental regulation is explored 
through a study of the Three Gorges Dam where World Bank Group 
financing for the project was denied because it did not conform with the 
Bank‘s environmental guidelines.53 David Szablowski offers a case 
study of the Antamina Mine in Peru which highlights the selective ab-
sence of the state in regulating conflicts between the company and the 
affected community.54 In his study of the P&O Port Project in Dahanu, 
                                                     
48
  See e.g. Neba & Ngeh, supra note 46; Macharia, supra note 46. See also Judith 
Kimerling, ―Recent Development: The Environmental Audit of Texaco‘s Amazon 
Oil Fields: Environmental Justice of Business as Usual?‖ (1994) 7 Harv Hum Rts J 
199, outlining the weaknesses of an environmental audit of Texaco‘s oilfield opera-
tions in the Amazon. 
49
  See Reyes, supra note 35. 
50
  See Christopher PM Waters, ―Who Should Regulate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipe-
line?‖ (2004) 16:3 Geo Int‘l Envtl L Rev 403. 
51
  See Sanjeev Khagram, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water 
and Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
52
  See SA Bronkhorst, ed, Liability for Environmental Damage and the World Bank’s 
Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for 
IUCN, 2000); Edwin Mujih, ―The Regulation of Multinational Companies Operat-
ing in Developing Countries: a Case Study of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project‖ 
(2008) 16:1 African Journal of International & Comparative Law 83. 
53
  William Shapiro, ―Human Rights and the Environment: IV. China‘s Three Gorges 
Dam‖ (1998) 9 Colo J Int‘l Envtl L & Pol‘y [YB] 146 at 154. 
54
  David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles (Oxford: Hart, 2007). 
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India, Oren Perez documents the community struggle against an inter-
national project to build what would be the biggest deep-water port in 
India.55 This account highlights the limits of efforts to regulate multi-
national enterprises in large projects where the environmental ramifica-
tions are significant.  
Industry-specific attempts at synthesis have also contributed to the 
understanding of certain types of large projects. The World Commission 
on Dams spawned an entire industry of dam studies.56 Dam projects are 
now the sites of a considerable number of project-specific studies.57 The 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project58 and the World 
Bank‘s Extractive Industries Review process59 both established impor-
tant benchmarks for further work on governance of extractive industry 
projects. Oil and gas projects, and particularly pipelines,60 have also 
                                                     
55
  Oren Perez, ―Reflections on an Environmental Struggle: P&O, Dahanu, and the 
Regulation of Multinational Enterprises‖ (2002) 15:1 Georgetown Int‘l Envtl L Rev 
1 at 14–15. 
56
  See e.g. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework 
for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000); Deborah Moore, John Dore & Di-
pak Gyawali, ―The World Commission on Dams + 10: Revisiting the Large Dam 
Controversy‖ 3:2 (2010) Water Alternatives 3; Peter Bosshard, ―The Dam Industry, 
the World Commission on Dams and the HSAF Process‖ (2010) 3:2 Water Alterna-
tives 58. 
57
  See e.g. William F Fisher, ed, Toward Sustainable Development?: Struggling Over 
India’s Narmada River (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1995); Philippe Cullet, ed, The Sar-
dar Sarovar Dam Project: Selected Documents (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Wilson 
Cabral de Sousa Júnior & John Reid, ―Uncertainties in the Amazon Hydropower 
Development: Risk Scenarios and Environmental Issues around the Belo Monte 
Dam‖ (2010) 3:2 Water Alternatives 249; Maarit Virtanen, ―Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Hydropower in Lao PDR: The Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project‖ 
(2006) 13:4 Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management 183. 
58
  See International Institute for Environment and Development, Breaking New 
Ground: The Report of the Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development Project 
(London: Earthscan, 2002). 
59
  See The World Bank Oil, Gas, Mining Unit, Extractive Industries Review Reports, 
online: <http://go.worldbank.org>. The Extractive Industries Review consists of six 
volumes of reports with a total of more than twenty individual reports. 
60
  See e.g. Michael M Wenig & Patricia Sutherland, ―Considering the Upstream 
/Downstream Effects of the Mackenzie Pipeline: Rough Paddling for the National 
Energy Board‖ (2004) 86 Resources 1, online: Canadian Institute of Resources Law 
<http://www.cirl.ca>; Van Hinte, supra note 44. 
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generated a project-specific literature, as have nuclear projects.61 In 
Canada, the tar sands are the subject of a growing body of research on 
environmental regulation.62 
Collections of case studies also attempt to shed empirical light on 
the use of corporate self-regulation in the environmental context. 
Noeleen McNamara, in a recent doctoral thesis, draws on case studies 
of large gold mines in Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, and Queensland, 
to address whether self-regulatory mechanisms are more important than 
formal legislation in motivating compliance with environmental laws.63 
These studies are valuable, but most often they offer a single-point-in-
time perspective of regulatory practices. Missing is a more long-term 
view of the interactive and dynamic regulatory relationships at stake. 
Particularly in the mining and oil and gas sectors, where mergers and 
acquisitions are so frequent, the key subjects of regulation can be con-
stantly moving targets. This may offer particular challenges for respon-
sive approaches to regulation where individual relationships are critical. 
Detailed case studies that adopt a pluralist lens to the regulation of 
projects allow us to grasp the multiple layers of project-specific envi-
ronmental regulation. Among the few examples of this work, Priscilla 
Schwartz‘s study of the Koidu Kimberlite Mining Project in Sierra 
Leone stands out as a rich and nuanced example of project-specific 
regulatory scholarship.64 She reveals how environmental regulation of 
                                                     
61
  Edward D Bayda, ―The Adequacy of the Public Inquiry Process for Assessing Ma-
jor Nuclear Facilities‖ (1980) 45:1 Sask L Rev 3; Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 
(AECL), Nuclear Energy Inquiries: National and International, Report AECL-
10768 by JAL Robertson (Chalk River: AECL, 1993). 
62
  See e.g. Pierre Gosslin et al, The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel: Environ-
mental and Health Impacts of Canada's Oil Sands Industry (Ottawa: Royal Society 
of Canada, 2010); Constance D Hunt & Alistair R Lucas, Environmental Regula-
tion: Its Impact on Major Oil and Gas Projects: Oil Sands and Arctic (Calgary: Ca-
nadian Institute of Resources Law, 1980); Oil Sands Advisory Panel, A Foundation 
for the Future: Building an Environmental Monitoring System for the Oil Sands 
(Ottawa: Minister of Environment, 2010); Steven A Kennett, ―Next Steps for Cu-
mulative Effects Management in Alberta‘s Athabasca Oil Sands Region‖ (2006) 96 
Resources 1, online: Canadian Institute of Resources Law <http://www.cirl.ca>. 
63
  Noeleen McNamara, The Environmental Regulation of Mining: An International 
Comparison (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern Queensland 2009), online: 
<http://eprints.usq.edu.au>. 
64
  See Schwartz, supra note 30. 
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the project operates through lease agreements, mining laws and poli-
cies, loan agreements, environmental assessment practices, World Bank 
guidelines, and contractual terms including requirements to comply 
with applicable ‖rules of international law‖ and ―best international 
standards‖. She further contextualizes this discussion of project regula-
tion by situating the project within the institutional limitations which 
hamper enforcement of environmental laws in Sierra Leone including 
―state-centric albeit uncoordinated bureaucratic processes, corruption, 
ill-defined responsibilities between departments and lack of technical 
capacity on the part of regulatory bodies.‖65  
Research on large project regulation admittedly faces a number of 
barriers to entry. This may explain the dearth of academic research. 
Large projects are few and regarded as idiosyncratic. They are context-
specific to such a degree that lessons may not be immediately translated 
to other contexts. Obtaining detailed information on these projects is 
challenging due to the private and often confidential nature of the gov-
erning contractual regimes. Given the highly contested nature of many 
of these projects, ―honest numbers‖ are hard to find.66 And understand-
ing the applicable webs of regulation demands time-consuming and in-
depth field work.  
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LARGE PROJECTS: 
A RESEARCH AGENDA 
While synthesis of existing studies of the environmental aspects of 
large project regulation may be lacking, the financial and economic de-
velopment dimensions of large project success and failure are the sub-
ject of enormous popular, political, and scholarly interest.67 The insights 
that emerge from taking a closer looking at environmental regulation 
are likely to be of broader significance—and interest—as an aspect of 
                                                     
65
  Ibid at 437. 
66
  See Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius & Werner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk: 
An Anatomy of Ambition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 5. Me-
gaprojects are not a field of ―honest numbers‖. Disputes around these projects are 
rife with allegations of bias in the work of environmental professionals.  
67
  See e.g. Erik J Woodhouse, ―The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment 
in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries‖ (2006) 38:2 NYUJ Int‘l L & 
Pol 121. 
540 UBC LAW REVIEW VOL. 44:3 
 
 
large project regulation. Understanding project-specific regulatory con-
texts may elucidate trends of wider regulatory significance, given the 
fact that many regulators, particularly in the developing world, are re-
peat actors in multiple projects. For example, aside from the ―usual 
suspects‖ such as international financial institutions, the private project 
sponsors are often the same in different countries, and the main interna-
tional NGOs are often the same (for example, International Rivers for 
dam projects). 
There is value in complementing conventional approaches to study-
ing environmental regulation (which focus on permitting and environ-
mental impact assessments) with understandings of de-centred ap-
proaches to regulation at the project level. These include studies of en-
vironmental regulation of projects through socially responsible invest-
ment, environmental insurance, project finance mechanisms, self-
regulation, standard-setting initiatives, and contractual mechanisms. In 
this section, I explore three particular opportunities for such research 
that might further elucidate the value of a broad conception of regula-
tory tools, and the potential for regulatory advance through the careful 
development of a well-conceived suite of these tools. The three exam-
ples of such tools I discuss are: (1) contracts, (2) project oversight and 
monitoring, and (3) international standards.  
To date, early examples of this research have emerged in the context 
of international investment law. This has the consequence of conceptu-
alizing large project regulation as a ―developing country‖ issue. John 
Braithwaite‘s 2006 essay on ―Responsive Regulation and Developing 
Economies‖ offers particularly helpful reflections on the challenges and 
opportunities for responsive approaches in developing countries.68 But 
large project regulation is not only an issue impacting developing coun-
tries. One goal of this essay is to highlight the challenges of large pro-
ject governance that transcend national borders and affect all countries, 
regardless of the nomenclature used to classify their level of economic 
development. A narrow focus that conceives large project regulation as 
an aspect of foreign investment law obscures the experimentation tak-
ing place around large project regulation in diverse contexts. 
                                                     
68
  Braithwaite, ―Developing Economies‖, supra note 5. 
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A. THE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF LARGE PROJECT GOVERNANCE 
Contracts are central to large project regulation. They provide a key 
mechanism for environmental regulation of project operations. Loan 
agreements, insurance agreements, investment agreements, construction 
contracts, environmental agreements, and community benefit agree-
ments are just a few examples of contracts that adopt environmental 
regulatory functions. The environmental significance of contracts can 
be obscured for a number of reasons. First, these contracts may not be 
public and thus their terms may be unknown. Second, as a form of pri-
vate law, the wider public and political significance of contracts can 
easily be missed. And third, the environmental regulatory aspects of 
contracts may be buried in larger contractual documents that address 
other issues. Contracts are highly contextualized instruments that can 
fine tune regulatory responses to the challenges of specific situations 
and unknown contingencies. They can provide for environmental per-
formance bonds or security deposits, which provide a ―stick‖ should 
negotiated attempts to secure environmental outcomes fail. But contrac-
tual provisions can equally entrench environmental disregard and fail to 
provide for responsive approaches to environmentally destructive be-
haviour. 
In the setting of large projects, contracts are critical because so many 
aspects of regulation are one-off and negotiated. For example, in inter-
national investment contracts, project-specific commitments have been 
concluded through stabilization clauses that freeze environmental laws 
and constrain the ability of host states to raise environmental standards 
in project settings and comply with international environmental law.69 
Stabilization clauses are contractual commitments not to interfere with 
the regulatory framework governing an investment project.70 These 
commitments typically can be found in contracts between global natural 
resource companies (or their local subsidiaries) and host governments. 
                                                     
69
  See Lorenzo Cotula, ―Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental 
Standards in Foreign Investment Contracts‖ (2006) 17:1 YB Int‘l Env L 111. 
70
  See Peter Cameron, International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Evaristus Oshionebo, ―Stabilization 
Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts: Legal, Economic and Social Im-
plications for Developing Countries‖ 10 Asper Review of International Business 
and Trade Law 1. 
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The clause may involve a commitment by the government not to alter 
the regulatory framework for the project, through legislation or other 
means, without the consent of the other contracting party, in effect 
freezing regulation as it applies to the contract; it may also provide for 
compensation of the investor for the economic impact of any new regu-
lation. Clauses may also specify compensation or ―restoration of the 
economic equilibrium‖ of the project in the event that a regulatory 
change causes prejudice to the project.71 Such clauses are intended to 
address investors‘ lack of confidence in the legal systems of developing 
countries.  
But contractual clauses cannot be examined in isolation. It is the in-
teraction between contract law and bilateral investment treaties that 
provides a more complete regulatory picture. Stabilization clauses can 
have a chilling effect on the introduction of new environmental regula-
tion.72 But the entrenching effect of the terms of bilateral investment 
treaties may be more significant. Understanding contractual commit-
ments in the context of bilateral investment treaties is made all the more 
pressing by recent robust arbitral interpretations of investor protections, 
including umbrella clauses and standards of fair and equitable treatment 
(FET), in these treaties. Umbrella clauses ―create an international law 
obligation that a host state shall, for example, ‗observe any obligation it 
may have entered to‘; ‗constantly guarantee the observance of the 
commitments it has entered into‘; or ‗observe any obligation it has as-
                                                     
71
  Host Government Agreement between and Among the Government of Turkey and 
[the MEP Participants] (19 October 2000) [Turkish HGA], articles 7.2(xi), 10.1(iii) 
& 10.3 [Turkish HGA], one of a series of contracts emerging as part of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Project. 
72
  One way to counteract the effect of stabilization contracts has been to attempt to 
negotiate environmental or human rights exemptions to broad stabilization clauses. 
For example, due to civil society protest, the BTC consortium made a unilateral 
commitment not to interpret the stabilization clause included in agreements such as 
the Turkish HGA, ibid, in such a way as to prevent host state regulation promoting 
human rights and environmental goals. This undertaking provided that such regula-
tion for human rights and environmental purposes met certain requirements which 
were directed to prevent host country abuse of this commitment. See Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline Company, BTC Human Rights Undertaking (22 September 2003), 
online: BP Caspian <http://subsites 
.bp.com>. 
2011 WHY STUDY LARGE PROJECTS 543 
 
 
sumed‘.‖73 FET standards are also a common feature of bilateral in-
vestment treaties, and they form part of the investment chapters of eco-
nomic integration agreements such as free trade agreements. As one 
author explains, ―[t]oday, non-compliance with the FET clause is the 
most alleged breach in international investment arbitrations, along with 
the protection against expropriation.‖74 
The contractual clauses discussed above are rare examples of 
clauses in the public domain. Certain foreign investment contracts and 
many project documents are not publicly available. Those that are may 
only be accessible through costly subscription services, or made pub-
licly available only under pressure exerted by international financial 
institutions (including recent reforms to the World Bank‘s disclosure 
policies).75 This demonstrates the concern that networked forms of envi-
ronmental regulation can be compromised by a lack of access to key 
contractual provisions.76  
                                                     
73
  Katia Yannaca-Small, ―Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agree-
ments‖ in OECD, International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and 
Tracking Innovations, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org> 101 at 102. See also 
Jarrod Wong, ―Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of 
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed 
Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes‖ (2006) 14:1 Geo Mason L Rev 135. 
74
  Sebastián López Escarcena, ―The Elements of Fair and Equitable Treatment in In-
ternational Investment Law‖, Policy Brief No 14 (April 2010) at 2, online: Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies <http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be>; see also Ioa-
na Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of 
Foreign Investment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
75
  In July 2010, the World Bank introduced a new policy on access to information. 
See World Bank, Access to Information, online: World Bank 
<http://www.worldbank.org>. 
76
  In response to international concerns that confidential contracts breed corruption 
and that greater transparency is needed, several sources of pressure urging the dis-
closure of contracts are mounting. The BTC contracts discussed above (supra notes 
35, 71) were disclosed after civil society uproar led the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC) to put pressure on BP to disclose the agreements; see Kyla Tienhaa-
ra, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors 
at the Expense of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 
115. In the wake of the recommendation by the Extractive Industries Review (supra 
note 59) that the World Bank Group require the disclosure of contracts in the ex-
tractive sector, the IFC altered its Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainabili-
ty to require that: (i) for significant new extractive industries projects, clients pub-
licly disclose their material project payments to the host government (such as royal-
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Environmental regulation of large projects through contracts does 
not only happen through investment agreements. Large mining and oil 
and gas projects, for example, are routinely subject to a range of envi-
ronmental protection demands from state and non-state communities of 
interest, and must answer these demands to secure a ―social license to 
operate‖, particularly in ecologically sensitive sites. Contracts with 
governments, local communities, and conservation organizations have 
emerged as one mechanism for responding to community demands for 
environmental safeguards. Negotiated agreements with companies may 
take the form of environmental agreements,77 impact and benefit 
agreements,78 or good neighbour agreements. They may also emerge as 
part of community-company negotiations on natural resource projects.79 
These negotiated agreements may respond to gaps in regulatory re-
gimes and add an additional layer of project-specific environmental 
regulation.  
                                                                                                                
ties, taxes and profit sharing), and the relevant terms of key agreements that are of 
public concern such as host government agreements (HGAs) and intergovernmental 
agreements (IGAs); see IFC, Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (30 
April 2006), online: IFC <http://www.ifc.org>. 
77
  See Affolder, supra note 34, for a discussion of the environmental agreement that 
governs the Ekati Diamond Mine in Canada‘s Northwest Territories; see also Ciaran 
O‘Faircheallaigh, Environmental Agreements in Canada: Aboriginal Participation, 
EIA Follow-up and Environmental Management of Major Projects (Calgary: Cana-
dian Institute of Resources Law, 2006); Meinhard Doelle, ―Regulating the Envi-
ronment by Mediation andContract Negotiation: A Case Study of the Dona Lake 
Agreement‖ (1992) 2:2 J Envtl L & Prac 129.  
78
  A data set of these agreements is now housed at University of Melbourne as part of 
the Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements (ATNS) Project, online: ATNS 
<http://www.atns.net.au>. 
79
  See Christian Rarivoson, ―The Mandena Dina, a Potential Tool at the Local Level 
for Sustainable Management of Renewable Natural Resources‖ in Jörg U Ganz-
horn, Steven M Goodman & Manon Vincelette, eds, Biodiversity, Ecology and 
Conservation of Littoral Ecosystems in Southeastern Madagascar, Tolagnaro (Fort 
Dauphin) (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2007) 309; for example, in the 
QIT Madagascar Minerals ilmenite mine, a dina (a Malagasy social contract) was 
negotiated between the communities and the mining company pursuant to which 
the company, the communities, and the Malagasy forest department co-manage 
conservation zones. The dina also incorporates the company‘s environmental and 
social programmes as set out in the Integrated Development Plan. 
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Contractual approaches to regulation illustrate the dynamic nature of 
regulation. The impact and benefit agreements, environmental agree-
ments, and community agreements referenced above are of fairly recent 
vintage. But contracts as an aspect of large project regulation were also 
the subject of interest in earlier decades. The late 1970s and early 1980s 
featured a period of intense interest in large project law and governance 
in a number of jurisdictions, with particular interest in contractual ap-
proaches. State or franchise agreements, which gave statutory effect to 
large project agreements, were the subject of much Australian scholar-
ship.80 In Canada, interest in environmental regulation generally, and 
contractual approaches to environment regulation more particularly, 
emerged, particularly in the context of debates surrounding natural re-
source development in Canada‘s North.81  
A further category of contracts that is deserving of greater regulatory 
scrutiny is standard form contracts.82 Energy and resource industry as-
sociations, particularly petroleum associations, are active in producing 
standardized contracts.83 Model or standard contracts can have enor-
                                                     
80
  See e.g. Leigh Warnick, ―State Agreements‖ (1988) 62:11 Austl LJ 878; Malcolm 
Hollick, ―Industry Agreement Acts and Environmental Management in Australia‖ 
(1983) 7:3 Environmental Management 253; KD MacDonald, ―The Negotiation 
and Enforcement of Agreements with State Government Relating to the Develop-
ment of Mineral Ventures‖ (1977) 1:1 Australia Mining Petroleum Law Journal 29; 
and for more recent work, see Michael Crommelin, ―State Agreements: Australian 
Trends and Experience‖ (1996) AMPLA Yearbook 328; Richard Hillman, ―The Fu-
ture Role for State Agreements in Western Australia‖ (2006) 25:3 (2006) Australian 
Resources and Energy Law Journal 293. 
81
  Andrew R Thompson, ―Contractual v. Regulatory Modes for Major Resource De-
velopment Projects‖ (1984) 8 Resources, online: Canadian Institute of Resources 
Law <http://www.cirl.ca>; Andrew R Thompson, Environmental Regulation in 
Canada: An Assessment of the Regulatory Process (Vancouver: Westwater Re-
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mous influence across individual projects. They evidence the need to 
look for environmental regulation in unanticipated places. 
A wide range of contracts thus take on environmental regulatory 
functions in project settings. Contracts can be extremely responsive to 
project-specific contexts and unforeseen issues. But as the concern 
around the use of stabilization clauses highlights, contracts can also 
lead to a gutting or undermining of otherwise applicable environmental 
regulation. A further concern that contracts raise is the ability to dis-
lodge contractual forms of environmental regulation by exiting the con-
tract. Chad demonstrated this in the context of the Chad–Cameroon 
pipeline project where it evaded World Bank conditions in a loan 
agreement by prepaying the loan. India avoided World Bank conditions 
by withdrawing its loan application in the Narmada dam project.84 Gov-
ernance through contracts allows parties to contract out of domestic law 
and apply ambiguous international standards as the only governing 
law.85 This concern can be better understood through a richer under-
standing of the multiple interacting arms of project-specific regulation, 
and the multiple levels of contractual regulation.  
Contracts fit within a wider context of public law and institutions for 
judicial enforcement. As Hugh Collins has so convincingly shown in 
the domestic law context, contracts regulate but they are also regu-
lated.86 Further research on the contractual governance of large projects 
could build upon Collins‘s study by examining how contracts are regu-
lated as a matter of transnational law. How important are contractual 
provisions in the large project context, where contracts are difficult to 
enforce? Further research could also check against the risk that legal 
scholars overstate the importance of contracts as an aspect of environ-
mental regulation. 
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B. PROJECT OVERSIGHT AND MONITORING  
In most jurisdictions where some form of environmental assessment is 
practiced, follow-up has been dubbed the weakest stage.87 Indeed, a 
common critique of large projects, whether they are situated in Mozam-
bique or Melbourne, is that oversight and monitoring regimes are ab-
sent or insufficient. While the terminology is often used loosely, moni-
toring frequently refers to some form of testing to measure the envi-
ronmental impacts of a project. Oversight generally refers to a ―watch-
dog‖ function of ensuring that the project proponent is complying with 
their environmental commitments. But oversight need not only refer to 
watching the performance of a project proponent. It also includes in its 
scope the oversight of regulators to see if they are performing their 
statutory duties. Environmental oversight bodies may emerge in project 
settings as a requirement of legislation, as part of a contractual agree-
ment to create such an institution, or in practice without an explicit leg-
islative, regulatory, or contractual basis.  
Given the multiple hats that host governments wear as investment 
attractors, tax and royalty collectors, and environmental regulators, 
their capacity and willingness to strictly monitor environmental regimes 
poses a problem in many project situations. Oversight bodies are one 
response to the lack of capacity and will to rigorously monitor project 
impacts. These bodies can have vastly different forms, functions, pow-
ers, and degrees of integration into other legal and regulatory processes. 
Yet remarkably little is known about the types of oversight bodies that 
exist in large projects and their efficacy. 
Monitoring institutions provide a useful point for thinking about the 
application of responsive regulatory approaches, as they can yield the 
information that is vital to escalating or de-escalating sanctions and 
supports. Responsiveness depends on fine-tuned and highly contextual-
ized responses to the activities of those being regulated. Accessing ac-
curate accounts of these activities can be a challenge in large project 
contexts, and monitoring institutions can play vital roles in respect to 
accessing information. 
Various forms of commission of inquiry have long accompanied 
large projects. In the UK, the so-called ―big public inquiry‖ has been a 
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mechanism for debating large go/no-go decisions for projects.88 In Can-
ada, Thomas Berger‘s Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry stands as a 
high water mark of public inquiry.89 A number of jurisdictions have also 
used committees of inquiry to examine the implications of uranium 
mining.90 
At the level of the individual project, monitoring agencies have 
emerged to provide a watchdog on environmental performance once the 
decision to approve a project is made. In Canada, diamond projects in 
the Mackenzie Valley have yielded various instructive experiments in 
structuring environmental oversight agencies.91 The emergence of these 
independent oversight agencies speaks to a monitoring gap in existing 
regulation; it also reflects a lack of trust on the part of the local, pre-
dominantly First Nations communities, that either government or the 
project proponent would live up to the commitments made as part of the 
environmental assessment process unless they were being ―watched‖.92 
These oversight institutions are tasked with both promoting Aboriginal 
participation and ensuring that government regulators and project pro-
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ponents keep to promises made with respect to environmental aspects 
of project governance. The Ekati Diamond Mine, Diavik Diamond 
Mine, and Snap Lake Diamond Mine have each adopted a distinct form 
of environmental oversight agency.93 These institutions provide inde-
pendent oversight of not only the project proponent (the traditional 
regulated entity) but also of the regulator (the government agencies 
tasked with regulating the project proponent). These monitoring agen-
cies also reflect how a flexible and responsive regulatory innovation 
introduced in one project (the independent environmental monitoring 
agency for the Ekati Mine) can create expectations that crystallize into a 
practice where such one-off innovations become expected by project-
affected communities, and even institutionalized in regulatory practice. 
Outside of Canada, other forms of project-specific environmental 
oversight have emerged as a result of agreements between mining com-
panies and affected communities. For example, the Good Neighbor 
Agreement (GNA) signed between community groups and the Stillwa-
ter Mine in Montana, establishes an oversight body at each of the 
mine‘s two project sites.94 A technology oversight committee was also 
established to ensure that responsible practices, including continuous 
technological improvements, are incorporated into the mine site opera-
tions.95 The mandate of these oversight committees includes monitoring 
the implementation of the GNA agreement, resolving disputes, and 
maintaining lines of communication between the parties.96 In order to 
function as both a technical watchdog and a conduit of information the 
oversight committees are vested with certain rights under the GNA in-
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cluding broad access to information from the proponent, as well as citi-
zen-sampling, mine access, and mine inspection rights.97 These bodies 
emerged as part of a contractual negotiation between concerned com-
munity groups and the company, a negotiation process that developed 
completely outside of governmental regulatory approval processes for 
the mine expansion.  
These project-specific examples of project ―watchdogs‖ speak to the 
concern that follow-up and monitoring are among the most problematic 
stages of environmental regulation. Project oversight has also emerged 
as a significant issue for international financial institutions. The World 
Bank Inspection Panel, established in 1993, was largely motivated by 
concerns about the impacts on local communities and the environment 
of several large Bank-funded projects. These included the Narmada pro-
jects in India, which attracted significant criticism from the NGO com-
munity of the environmental assessment process and the way in which 
resettlement issues were addressed.98 The Inspection Panel hears re-
quests for inspection from organizations or other groupings of two or 
more individuals that believe they are likely to be adversely affected 
from the Bank‘s violation of its own policies and procedures. The In-
spection Panel has also spawned oversight agencies at other interna-
tional institutions. These include the Independent Evaluation Group for 
the World Bank Group institutions, the Accountability Mechanism at 
the Asian Development Bank, and the Independent Review Mechanism 
at the African Development Bank Group. Examples of oversight at in-
ternational financial institutions highlight the transnational dimensions 
of regulatory approaches. While projects intensely affect local envi-
ronments, many key regulators are transnational institutions. 
C. ―INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS‖ AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
International standards offer a particularly useful lens for thinking about 
responsive approaches to project regulation as they provide a dynamic 
means of ratcheting up standards, rather than fixing regulation on rules 
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―that ossify industry standards at the state of the art at the times rules 
were written.‖99 A regulatory approach that relies on flexible standards 
may offer a welcome departure from regulatory approaches fixated on 
narrow interpretations of rule compliance where cosmetic compliance is 
always a risk. But ―international standards‖ present their own chal-
lenges as a regulatory device.  
References to ―international standards‖ in project documents emerge 
in different ways and with different legal consequences. Standards can 
be technical performance standards or broad statements of principle. 
They can be best-practice guides rather than mandatory enforceable 
rules. Some references to standards are industry-specific and thus de-
note ―international standards‖ applicable in a particular industry. An 
example of this is ―good oilfield practices‖, which were introduced as a 
source of regulation in a production sharing agreement between the 
Government of Georgia and Canargo Norio Ltd.100 Corporations or 
banks may also impose their own standards applicable to all global op-
erations, such as Goldman Sachs‘s Environmental Policy and its en-
dorsement of the Benchmark of Biodiversity Management Practices.101 
In large project settings, ―international standards‖ are often intended to 
refer to the International Finance Corporation‘s Performance Standards, 
which have become a commonly used yardstick for social and envi-
ronmental ―safeguards‖ in large projects.102  
Views on the regulatory significance of ―international standards‖ 
differ sharply. Thomas Wälde, who spent many years advising corpora-
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tions and governments on transnational contracts, suggests that the task 
of managing compliance with international standards has become a ma-
jor challenge for both management and legal professionals in the natu-
ral resource and energy sectors.103 He suggests that global standards 
work as a regulatory device both directly and indirectly. Their direct 
function is to operate by incorporation into treaties, conflicts and regu-
lation. But they also operate indirectly by ―giving more specificity and 
substance to open-ended standards in the primary legal instruments, 
they legitimize legal argument and arbitral decision-making and they 
provide some protection [for corporations] from NGO campaigns oper-
ating through public opinion.‖104 Picking up on this last point, Judith 
Kimerling, who has campaigned against Occidental Petroleum‘s opera-
tions in Ecuador‘s Amazon Oil Fields, is particularly concerned that the 
lack of specificity and transparency around corporate references to ―in-
ternational standards‖ invites corporate manipulation of these standards. 
She suggests that ―Occidental has used ‗international standards‘ to wrap 
its activities in a veneer of environmental excellence; reassure govern-
ment officials and local residents; cultivate confusion about standards 
and practices that apply to the operations; deflect meaningful oversight 
and transparency; and arbitrarily legitimize norms that have been de-
fined by special interests.‖105 
There is room for research into the ways in which international stan-
dards are integrated into corporate management and impact the behav-
iour of companies from within. Given the often glacial nature of inter-
national environmental treaty negotiation, international standards are an 
important site for articulating international norms. This means that 
companies will be attentive to the ratcheting up of environmental stan-
dards through developments in ―international standards‖.106  
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While international standards, oversight agencies, and project-
specific contracts all force us to think about the opportunities for a more 
careful consideration of decentred approaches to large project regula-
tion, the capacity of regulators to coordinate such approaches cannot be 
assumed. The model of a local government ―harnessing‖ other public 
and private organizations to promote its goals may be misplaced. Fur-
ther, the multiplicity of actors and issues involved means that it may not 
be possible to ―design‖ a regulatory system where the interactions be-
tween regulators are coordinated or ―networked‖ in any prescriptive 
way.  
V. CONCLUSION: MUSINGS ON METHODS 
This article has argued that the environmental aspects of large project 
regulation are worthy, and indeed deserving, of greater study. I have 
drawn together examples of a disparate literature that illustrate that 
there are case-based studies from which ambitious and theoretically-
informed meta-analysis can develop. One of the challenges for future 
researchers is not only to produce more individual case studies, but to 
think about appropriate methodologies for building upon new and exist-
ing case studies. I have suggested three avenues for descriptively thick 
new research on environmental regulation in large project settings 
(regulation through contracts, monitoring agencies, and international 
standards) that can complement existing case studies. And I have pro-
vided an example of the best of this sort of scholarship—the 
―Braithwaitean‖ tradition which combines careful empirical investiga-
tion, ambitious meta-analysis, and dynamic theorizing.  
What is left to acknowledge, then, are the immense methodological 
challenges of creating such expansive, yet carefully informed, work. I 
have already alluded to the very challenge of defining ―environmental 
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regulation‖. I admit that it is not only decentred approaches to regula-
tion that require further elucidation. In many cases, knowledge of con-
ventional and market-based approaches to regulation in many project 
settings is lacking. Environmental regulation can involve complex and 
uncertain technical and scientific issues. It takes place against a back-
drop of regulatory initiatives that are often constantly moving targets. 
International treaties, European Community legislation, and domestic 
law from multiple jurisdictions combine to produce a mind-numbing 
package of applicable law, all of which can be complex and fast-
developing. 
A first step in promoting meta-analysis of environmental regulation 
of large projects is promoting a conversation about large projects 
among regulatory scholars. This is a conversation that extends regula-
tory debates in new directions and invites scholars to tackle issues of 
environmental regulation that are highly contested and relevant beyond 
the developed countries where responsive regulation debates have 
mostly flared. But it is not a conversation that can be limited to schol-
ars. It implicates all those who regulate, and are regulated, in large pro-
ject contexts. It is also a conversation that can change the way that we 
teach environmental law and regulation. Large project regulation be-
longs in our textbooks of national and international environmental law.  
The cross-cutting work this article hopes to promote is not intended 
to yield a recipe for regulation that can be applied across the globe. It 
does not envisage environmental law as a cut-and-paste tool. Rather, 
this article has higher aspirations: to encourage the carefully nuanced, 
thought-provoking, and intellectually rigorous sort of scholarship that 
John Braithwaite has taught us is possible. 
 
